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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: DECLINING FORCE
OF THE RULE REQUIRING MUTUALITY OF REMEDY
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Gould v.
Stelter' has placed that state among the growing number of jurisdic-
tions that have either expressly or impliedly abandoned the mutuality
of remedy requirement in an action for specific performance of a
contract. In a suit to compel conveyance under a contract for sale of
realty, the contract in question had been sign~ed by the vendee's agent
without the necessary written authorization so that under the Statute
of Frauds, the vendee was not bound by the contract from its incep-
tion. However, between the time the agreement was made and the time
of suit, the contract had become enforceable against the vendee be-
cause of his adoption and ratification. Defendant vendors moved to
dismiss the complaint, arguing that because the vendee was not bound
by the contract when made, there was an absence of mutuality of
remedy and hence the agreement was not specifically enforceable
against them. The lower court's dismissal on this ground was reversed
by the supreme court, which held that "want of mutuality of remedy
at the inception of the contract is not a bar to specific performance."
The above case involves one of the typical factual situations3 in
1. 14 Ill. 2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958).
It should be noted that there has been some confusion among the courts in
differentiating between mutuality of remedy and mutuality of obligation. The
latter relates to a prerequisite to the formation of a binding agreement and is
merely a way of saying there must be valid consideration. See I Williston, Con-
tracts § 105A (3d ed. 1957). Assuming that there is such a legally binding
agreement, for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, then the doctrine
of mutuality of remedy becomes applicable in determining whether and how a
court of equity will act. It is this concept of mutuality of remedy as affecting
equity enforcement which is the subject of this note.
For a general discussion of the distinction between mutuality of obligation
and mutuality of remedy, see Stone, The Mutuality Rule in New York, 16 Colum.
L. Rev. 443 (1916).
2. Gould v. Stelter, 14 IIl. 2d 376, 382, 152 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1958).
3. Situations in which the mutuality of remedy problem arises because the con-
tract could not have been specifically enforced had defendant brought an action
against the plaintiff include: contracts dependent upon some election or other act
by plaintiff, such as an option; contracts for personal services to be performed
by plaintiff; contracts to sell property owned by another; other contracts unen-
forceable against plaintiff when made because of lack of capacity, the Statute of
Frauds, or because he is an assignee.
For a complete analysis of these various situations, see Lewis, Specific Per-
formance of Contracts-Defense of Lack of Mutuality, 40 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 270,
383, 447, 507, 559 (1901) ; 41 id. 251, 329 (1902) ; Annot. 22 A.L.R.2d 508 (1952).
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which the doctrine requiring mutuality of remedy is invoked. In the
light of its holding rejecting the doctrine, this note will reexamine
the requirement of mutuality of remedy, trace its development, and
analyze the expressions of dissatisfaction with it as they have influ-
enced the more recent decisions. Finally, the position of the Missouri
courts with respect to the doctrine will be discussed.
There are two aspects to the doctrine of mutuality of remedy, one
affirmative and one negative. Under the affirmative aspect, the plaintiff
is entitled to specific performance, irrespective of the adequacy of his
remedy at law, if the defendant could have maintained an action for
specific performance in a hypothetical converse case. 4 The effect of
this phase of the rule is to grant an additional remedy to the plaintiff.
In most cases, this would seem to cause no hardship or injustice to the
defendant who merely must perform his promise instead of being
allowed to breach it, subject to liability for damages. Of course, a
procedural result of allowing plaintiff to bring the equitable action is
that defendant will not be entitled to a jury trial, but even in the
alternative suit for damages for breach of contract the right to a jury
trial is not ordinarily of great importance.5 However, the granting of
this additional remedy to the plaintiff, though producing no hardship,
does result in an inconsistency. The normal remedy for non-per-
formance of an agreement is an action for damages for the breach,
not specific performance. The remedy of specific performance tradi-
tionally has been given as a substitute for the legal remedy of com-
pensation only after a finding that judgment for money damages is
inadequate or impracticable.6 Since the plaintiff might have an ade-
quate remedy at law, the affirmative aspect of the doctrine of mutual-
ity grants the remedy, not out of need to do more perfect and complete
justice, but merely to "even up the sides." If a court of law could
render a fair and adequate result, there seems to be no cogent reason
why an equity court should grant relief, even though the equitable
remedy might be necessary to secure defendant's performance of his
promise.'
The negative, or defensive, aspect of the rule requiring mutuality
works a hardship on the plaintiff by denying him a remedy to which
4. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Germansky, 233 N.Y. 365, 135 N.E. 601 (1922);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Berry, 153 S.C. 496, 151 S.E. 63 (1930).
5. See McClintock, Equity § 68, at 185 (2d ed. 1948).
6. 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1136, at 610, § 1139 (1951); 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence § 1401 (5th ed. 1941).
7. Little more will be said of the affirmative aspect of the rule. It should
be noted that this aspect has been rejected in some states, but adopted as one of a
number of factors for court consideration by the Restatement of Contracts § 372
(2) (1932).
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he would otherwise have been entitled. Relief is refused even though
the plaintiff's remedy at law is clearly inadequate and the defendant's
obligation could otherwise be enforced in equity, simply because the
same type of relief could not have been given the defendant had he
brought suit. This limitation upon equitable jurisdiction is said to
have found basis upon two concepts: (1) a court of equity is a court
which must be fair to all parties, and equality is fairness, and (2)
equitable relief is wholly discretionary because the plaintiff always has
an action for damages if his bill for specific performance is denied.,
Thus, since early courts of equity believed the element of fairness
(i.e., equality) would be lacking where defendant could not have been
given specific performance had he brought the action, it was felt that
plaintiff should be denied the discretionary relief and left to his action
for damages.9 It is submitted, however, that this refusal to grant
relief was improperly based on an over-emphasis of the principle that
equality is fairness. Clearly, there is nothing fair or equitable in deny-
ing relief to one who suffers from a breach of contract and has no
adequate remedy at law, merely because the wrongdoer can argue that
if he had brought the action he could not have obtained specific per-
formance.o Only when circumstances are substantially the same on
both sides should equity require equal treatment of the palties. "As
between an injured plaintiff and a wrongdoing defendant, equality is
not equity."'
The rule that specific performance must be mutually available had
its beginnings in English cases of the early 19th century,1 2 although
it has generally been called the "Fry doctrine" because Lord Justice
Fry gave it recognition and crystallization in his work on Specific
Performance. 3 Fry's expression of the doctrine was stated in such
manner as to apply to cases in which there was want of mutuality at
the inception of the contract,14 and he seems to have formulated it as a
broad generalization based on the decision in Flight v. Bolland where
8. Lewis, The Present Status of the Defence of Want of Mutuality in Specific
Performance, 42 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 591, 592 (1903).
9. Ibid.
10. See, Durfee, Mutuality in Specific Performance, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 289, 291
(1922).
11. 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1182, at 800 (1951).
12. See, e.g., Lawrenson v. Butler, 1 Sch. & Lef. 13 (Ch. 1802); Flight v.
Bolland, 4 Russ. 298, 38 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch. 1828); Lewis, Specific Performance
of Contracts-Defense of Lack of Mutuality, 40 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 270 (1901).
13. Fry, Specific Performance of Contracts § 286 (2d ed. 1861).
14. "A contract, to be specifically enforced by the Court, must be mutual-
that is to say-such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been en-
forced by either of the parties against the other of them." Id. at 198.
15. 4 Russ. 298, 38 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch. 1828).
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the contract was not specifically enforced on behalf of an infant be-
cause it could not have been enforced against him. But Fry's state-
ment is a misdescription of the past decisions of the English courts
of equity,'r primarily because he failed to distinguish cases where
there was continuous lack of mutuality of remedy and those where
mutuality was lacking at the inception but not at the time the bill was
brought. In Flight v. Bolland, had the infant plaintiff withdrawn the
action, the defendant could neither have prevented it nor have had
specific performance. However, if the infant, on coming of age, had
affirmed the contract, he could have gotten specific performance even
though when the contract was entered into there was no mutuality of
remedy."7 Although Fry stated of his doctrine that "no rule in equity
is more thoroughly settled than this,"' even he had to recognize cer-
tain exceptions to it,1" because in all probability he realized the funda-
mental weakness of its basis.
In spite of the weak basis for Fry's rule, it was literally followed
by some courts,20 often with obvious injustice,2 1 and for a while was
not questioned by other writers. Pomeroy, in his treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence, accepted the doctrine as one commonly stated by the
courts but recognized limits in its application.22 Later editions of
Pomeroy's works stated that the rule required mutuality of remedy
only at the time suit was brought, and not at the time of making of
the contract.23 To overcome further the obvious harshness of the nega-
16. Cook, The Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule, 36 Yale L.J.
897, 900 (1927) ; Lewis, The Present Status of the Defence of Want of Mutuality
in Specific Performance, 42 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 591, 593 (1903) ("mutuality of
remedy at the inception of the contract has never been required .... ").
17. Lewis, supra note 16, at 593-95. See Lewis, Specific Performance of Con-
tracts-Defense of Lack of Mutuality, 40 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 270 (1901) (paper
entitled "Mutuality as Understood in the Eighteenth Century").
18. Fry, op. cit. supra note 13, § 286, n.1.
19. Id. §§ 290-99.
20. See, e.g., Luse v. Dietz, 46 Iowa 205 (1877); Ten Eyck v. Manning, 52
N.J. Eq. 47; 27 Atl. 900 (1893).
21. For example, in Luse v. Dietz, 46 Iowa 205 (1877), plaintiff tendered to
defendant the deed to the property in question. At the time of the formation of
the contract the property was in his wife's name and the court denied plaintiff's
bill for specific performance because he was not bound by the contract at its
inception. The defendant therefore was allowed to take advantage of his breach.
This seems inequitable when weighed against the hypothetical situation that
plaintiff may have chosen not to perform.
22. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1405 (3d ed. 1905).
23. 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 2191 (4th ed. 1919). The exact time
when the mutuality of remedy must exist is a matter on which there has not
been agreement. As originally stated by Fry, the rule required mutuality at the
inception of the contract. See note 14 supra. Realizing the harshness of this view,
some courts have required mutuality of remedy only at the time the suit is filed.
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tive application of the rule, courts and writers began stating numerous
exceptions and limitations.24
Since the turn of this century, the rule requiring mutuality of
remedy has been under heavy attack, led principally by Professors
Lewis25 and Ames.26 Lewis, after an extensive review of the English
and American cases, concluded that application of the rule resulted
in injustice. He urged that specific performance be granted to a
plaintiff in all cases where the contract is fair and reasonable and
the court is capable of enforcing the defendant's obligations, without
regard to any exception on the ground of want of mutuality in the
remedy.27 Ames, in rejecting the rule of mutuality of remedy as
"inaccurate and misleading,"' 28 suggested instead a rule of mutuality of
performance to express more clearly what he considered the simple
and just underlying principle of the decisions denying plaintiff specific
performance, viz., to protect the defendant from being left with only a
common law action for damages against the plaintiff as security for
his own performance.29
Corbin, while commending Ames for his work in showing the weak-
ness of the mutuality requirement, believes that Ames' suggested rule
places too much emphasis on the remedy in damages as security, and
as a better rule he would require "satisfactory security" without sin-
gling out any specific kind.30 He urges the abandonment of the sup-
posed requirement of mutuality of remedy2 and states the better
reasoned rule to be this: "The court may properly refuse specific en-
See, e.g., Standard Lumber Co. v. Florida Industrial Co., 106 Fla. 884, 141 So.
729 (1932). Others have declared that mutuality of remedy must exist at the
time the decree is issued. See, e.g., Pierce v. Watson, 252 Ala. 15, 39 So. 2d 220
(1949).
24. Durfee, supra note 10 at 291. In addition to the exceptions recognized by
Fry, see note 19 supra, Ames thought there were eight, Ames, Mutuality in
Specific Performance, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1903); and Clark lists ten, Clark,
Equity §§ 175-80 (1919).
25. Lewis, Specific Performance of Contracts-Defense of Lack of Mutuality,
40 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 270, 383, 447, 507, 559 (1901); 41 id. 251, 329 (1902);
Lewis, The Present Status of the Defence of Want of Mutuality in Specific
Performance, 42 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 591 (1903).
26. Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1903).
27. Lewis, supra note 25, 42 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 591, 629 (1903).
28. Ames, supra note 26, at 8.
29. "Equity will not compel specific performance by a defendant, if after
performance the common law remedy of damages would be his sole security for the
performance of the plaintiff's side of the contract." Id. at 12. This restatement
of the doctrine of mutuality was the one later accepted by Pomeroy, in place of
his former statement. 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 2191 (4th ed. 1919).
30. 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1186 (1951).
31. 5 id. § 1181.
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forcement if some substantial part of the agreed exchange for the
defendant's performance has not yet been rendered and its perform-
ance is not sufficiently assured to the satisfaction of the court. ' 32 The
chief merit of such a rule is that it leaves much to the discretion of the
court, and recognizes that there is no such thing as mechanical jus-
tice.33 And yet the rule gives the court a workable test-sufficient as-
surance of plaintiff's performance-on which to grant specific per-
formance. The court may direct its attention to various factors in
making this determination, such as the inadequacy of money damages
as a remedy and what constitutes satisfactory security that plaintiff's
future performance will be rendered.2 4
The criticism leveled at the Fry doctrine by these commentators
has had its effect on the decisions of the courts. Some courts have
rejected the rule entirely;$5 while others, not expressly rejecting it,
have found ways to make it inapplicable. 6 It is submitted that rejec-
tion of the rule is correct and that the flexible principle stated above
can stand much better in its stead. The reasons advanced for the rule
(equality is equity, and equity's relief is discretionary 37) are insuffi-
cient 38 to deny relief to a plaintiff who is being deprived of his just
remedy on the sole ground that the same remedy would not have been
available to the defendant in a hypothetical converse situation. Under
the rule, the courts have not dealt with the equities of the parties as
they actually existed but have denied the relief sought by the plaintiff
because, under a hypothetical state of facts, the defendant would not
have been entitled to similar relief.39 No such mechanical rule can be
32. 5 id. § 1183.
33. In accord with Corbin's suggestion of leaving the matter of granting
specific performance to the discretion of the court: 5 Williston, Contracts § 1440
(rev. ed. 1937); Restatement, Contracts §§ 372(1), 373 (1932); Durfee, supra
note 10, at 312.
34. 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1183 (1951).
35. Gould v. Stelter, 14 Ill. 2d 376, 152 N.E.2d 869 (1958) ; Peterson v. Johnson
Nut Co., 204 Min. 300, 283 N. W. 561 (1939); Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490,
135 N.E. 861 (1922).
36. See, e.g., Zelleken v. Lynch, 80 Kan. 746, 104 Pac. 563 (1909); State
Highway Comm'n v. Golden, 112 N.J. Eq. 156, 163 Ati. 551 (1933). In five states
a rule requiring mutuality of remedy at the time of suit has been legislatively
enacted: Ala. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 51 (1940); Cal. Civ. Code § 3386 (Deering
1949); Mont. Rev. Code § 17-803 (1947); N.D. Rev. Code § 32-0408 (1943);
S.D. Code § 37.4604 (1939).
37. See text supported by note 8 supra.
38. See Corbin's criticism of the statement that equality is equity at 5 Corbin,
Contracts § 1182 (1951).
39. Lewis points out that this argument rests on two incorrect assumptions:
(a) the probability that the plaintiff will not live up to his part of the contract
after obtaining a decree; (b) the decree would become unfair if the plaintiff failed
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framed which will observe the equities of the situation. ° Whenever
a plaintiff, through no fault of his own, has been unjustly and wrong-
fully deprived of a promised performance for which deprivation a
remedy at law would be inadequate, and a court of equity can remedy
this wrong without leaving the defendant in an overly vulnerable posi-
tion, then, without recourse to the doctrine of mutuality, specific
performance should be granted.41
The attitude of the Missouri courts towards the requirement of
mutuality has gone through the same confused development experi-
enced in many other states. There are two cases dealing with the
affirmative aspect. In Paris v. Haley42 the court said as dictum that it
was "well established that a vendor may maintain a suit for specific
performance in all cases where the vendee can sue for a specific
performance. 4 - 3 The Kansas City Court of Appeals followed this
dictum in Rice v. Griffith,44 holding that defendants were entitled to
specific performance on their counterclaim since plaintiff could have
obtained specific performance against defendants. The court flatly
stated that in Missouri "the doctrine has been based upon the theory
of mutuality. ' 4 5 But this holding was reversed by the Missouri Su-
preme Court,46 which pointed out that it was not correct to say that
specific performance may be obtained by one party whenever it is
available to his opponent.4 7 Thus, as the law relating to the affirmative
aspect now stands, the Missouri Supreme Court will not grant specific
to perform, although it is fair when made. Lewis, supra note 25, 42 Am. L. Reg.
(n.s.) 591, 626 (1903).
40. See Cook, The Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule, 36 Yale
L.J. 897, 912 (1927).
41. The most famous case advocating this test for granting specific performance
is Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922), wherein Justice Cardozo
said: "What equity exacts today as a condition of relief is the assurance that the
decree, if rendered, will operate without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff
or to defendant. Mutuality of remedy is important in so far only as its presence
is essential to the attainment of that end." Id. at 494, 135 N.E. at 862. Other
recent cases which seem to follow this modern view that specific performance be
granted where "injustice or oppression" will not result to either party are:
Morad v. Silva, 331 Mass. 94, 117 N.E.2d 290 (1954); Fleischer v. James Drug
Stores, 1 N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383 (1948); Vanzandt v. Heilman, 54 N.M. 97, 214
P. 2d 864 (1950). Temple Enterprises v. Combs, 164 Ore. 133, 100 P.2d 613
(1940); Jones v. English, 268 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
42. 61 Mo. 453 (1875).
43. Id. at 457.
44. 144 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. App. 1940).
45. Id. at 842. This case is noted in 26 Wash. U.L.Q. 431 (1941).
46. Rice v. Griffith, 349 Mo. 373, 161 S.W.2d 220 (1942).
47. Id. at 383, 161 S.W.2d at 225.
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performance in all cases where the defendant would have been so
entitled .48
As to the negative aspect of the rule, in an early Missouri case4 9
mutuality of remedy at the inception of the contract was required.
This view was followed in McCall v. Atchley 0 where the plaintiff, even
though he had performed the personal services which were a condition
to the defendant's performance, was denied specific performance.51
But this decision was criticized and overruled nineteen years later in
Jones v. Jones 2 where the Missouri Supreme Court held that the doc-
trine of mutuality was limited to cases where the contract was still
executory or partly executory, but had no application where the plain-
tiff seeking specific performance had fully performed.5 3 The require-
ment of mutuality was thus held to be satisfied if the mutuality existed
at the time of suit, and where the party seeking specific performance
had already fully performed, mutuality ceased to be material and was
no defense to the other party.5 4
The trend of Missouri decisions, therefore, has been toward the
abandonment of Fry's doctrine that there be mutuality of remedy at
the inception of the contract. But the Missouri Supreme Court has not
gone far enough. The court, though rejecting Fry's limited and in-
flexible rule, has not broken away from it entirely. While the court
has rephrased the rule's application, it continues to retain the form
of a general rule. Any such general rule of a court of equity tends to
result in unjust decisions because of a natural inclination to follow the
rule without a close examination of the equities of the particular case.
Therefore it is submitted that the Missouri Court should take the last
step necessary to free itself from all the influences of Fry's rule by
48. See Restatement, Contracts § 372 (2) (1932). It would appear the Missouri
couit is now following this view.
49. Glass v. Rowe, 103 Mo. 513, 15 S.W. 334 (1890).
50. 256 Mo. 39, 164 S.W. 593 (1914).
51. In explaining mutuality the court said: "The contract must be mutual
with respect to the right of the respective parties to the equitable remedy. This
means that, in so far as the consideration, upon which the right to specific per-
formance rests, consists of an executory agreement, that agreement should be of
such a nature that it entitles the party to whom it runs to have it specifically
enforced according to its very terms." Id. at 54, 164 S.W. at 598. See also Falder
v. Dreckshage, 227 S.W. 929 (Mo. App. 1921).
52. 333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146 (1933).
53. Id. at 491, 63 S.W.2d at 153.
54. Ibid. See Kludt v. Connett, 350 Mo. 793, 168 S.W.2d 1068 (1943). This case
contains a good analysis of the Missouri cases dealing with the negative aspect of
mutuality of remedy. The court believes that, while the Missouri cases are not
entirely in harmony, Missouri's position is close to that of § 372(1) of the Restate-
ment of Contracts. Id. at 804-05, 168 S.W.2d at 1072-1073.
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expressly rejecting it, as did the Illinois court, and thereby prevent
any future confusion and injustice that the rule may continue to cause.
A court of equity should grant relief when it is sure that its decree
"will operate without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or to
defendant. Mutuality of remedy is important in so far only as its
presence is essential to the attainment of that end."', After examining
each factual situation equity should grant specific performance when-
ever it can properly exercise reasonable control over the dispute, both
as to the parties and as to present and future actions.
55. Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 494, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (1922).
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